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Abstract 
Market liberalization at the domestic level and at the boarder level has been a dominant feature 
of market reforms in most developing countries including Bangladesh during the last two 
decades. A pre-requisite for producers and consumers to benefit from this new and changing 
market environment is the ability of market to function efficiently at their spatial or through the 
value chain dimensions which are very often constrained by different factors. The vertical 
integration of grain markets plays a crucial role in improving the welfare of the producers and 
the consumers. Therefore, the better the market integration, the lesser the intervention required 
by the government. There was a widely-held belief about the domestic markets in Bangladesh on 
possible manipulation in the agricultural markets as well as concerns about the sources of 
asymmetry. In the domestic markets, a price increase passes very quickly though the supply 
chain compared to a price decrease. As a result, perception by consumers and the government 
exists that at least the market is being manipulated, raising food prices unfairly, at the expenses 
of the poor households who are net buyers and for whom food is a major expenditure share 
(about 40-50 percent).   
Examining, the market functioning at the vertical level in developing countries is of importance 
to evaluate how the private traders delivering to the market. That is why it is important to 
identify what kind of policy can be introduced and at what level of the marketing chain to correct 
the market inefficiency, if needed. The vertical price leadership at the wholesale level to the 
retail in the marketing literature is inferred but not empirically verified. Therefore, this paper is 
an attempt to fill up this gap. It first examines the price transmission between the wholesale and 
retail level of the rice market in Bangladesh in the regime of the changing market environment. 
Secondly, it examines whether the wholesale market dominates the retail one. Thirdly, it 
analyzes whether the price relationship is symmetric with respect to price increases and price 
decreases. The paper uses the average wholesale and retail price of rice for Bangladesh. The 
monthly price data used for this study are taken from FAO and different published series of 
Statistical Yearbook and the Economic Trend. The data period cover from February 2002 to 
June, 2007. From our unit root test, we find that the level data contain one unit root but are 
stationary at their first differences. Both Engel-Granger (1987) bi-variate and Johansen (1990) 
multivariate cointegration tests were applied to determine a linear combination which is 
stationary. Then the existence of long run causality was tested within the framework of Johansen 
cointegration by standard Wald test. To test the asymmetric transmission in the prices we used 
the asymmetric ECM-EG approach. The results show that the wholesale and retail prices are 
integrated, and in the line of the industrial organization theory, the wholesale price plays a 
leadership role to determine the retail prices. Results also confirm that the consumer and public 
concern about the asymmetric price transmission holds true.   
Key words: vertical supply chain, asymmetry, rice markets, Bangladesh  
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1. Introduction  
Market liberalization at the domestic level and at the boarder level has been a dominant feature 
of market reforms in most developing countries during the last two decades. Bangladesh has 
undertaken extensive market reforms, its main food grain rice by both reducing public 
intervention for procurement and distribution, and opening-up most of the private imports since 
1992 (Ahmed, 1996). Rice accounts for a high caloric share in the diet of the Bangladeshi 
population. It is also the most important cereal crop produced and occupies a major share of the 
farmers’ agricultural income and the employment. Therefore, a pre-requisite for producers and 
consumers to benefit from this new and changing market environment is the ability of market to 
function efficiently. But if the market at the spatial or through the value chain  dimensions are 
constrained by factors such as imperfect market information, lack of credit availability to finance 
short run inventories, insufficient transportation, lack of management skills, market power etc. 
the inferred benefits from reforms will be jeopardized.  
The liberalization of the rice markets in Bangladesh has significantly changed the structure of the 
markets. In the post-liberalization period, the activities of the private traders have increased and 
have contributed for the country’s overall food security especially after a devastating flood in 
1998 (Dorosh, 2001, Carl Ninno, 2003). Subsequently, the Bangladesh government’s roles in 
rice procurement and distribution decreased at their minimum level. Thus, there is an emerging 
market structure which is dominated by the private traders. Even though Bangladesh is one of the 
world’s major rice importers, about 80-85 percent of its total domestic food requirement comes 
from the domestic production which has benefitted from the domestic market reforms. Market 
liberalization has increased the rice productivity and therefore it has decreased real producer and 
consumer prices (Irina Klytchnikova, 2006). Furthermore, boarder policy has contributed to the 
domestic price stabilization and national food security (Dorosh, 2001). So far, there is no study 
which has examined the market efficiency capturing the potential asymmetry either at the spatial 
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level or through the value chain. Examining the market efficiency in the regime of market 
liberalization is mainly limited to the spatial level, i. e., testing the law of one price (Dawson, 
2002), and to estimating the structural determinants of market integration (Golletti, 1995). 
Therefore, there is a dearth of information on the nature of the price relationships in the vertical 
level under the new market structure. The vertical integration of grain markets plays a crucial 
role in improving the food security and the welfare of the poor consumers. The degree and the 
nature of integration also determine the level of intervention required by the government to 
correct the inefficiencies in the market, if required. Therefore, better the market integration, 
lesser the intervention required by the government. The food grain (mainly rice) marketing 
chains are long in developing countries because of many small scale intermediaries which make 
the producer prices to be lower and consumer prices to be higher, therefore resulting in the 
higher price spread. This was true in the case of commercial rice marketing in Bangladesh. There 
was a widely-held belief about the domestic markets that possible manipulation in the 
agricultural markets as well as concerns about the sources of asymmetry. In the domestic 
markets, a price increase passes very quickly though the supply chain compared to a price 
decrease. As a result, perception by consumers and the government exists that at least the market 
is being manipulated and raising food prices unfairly, at the expenses of the poor households 
who are net buyers and for whom food is a major expenditure share (about 40-50 percent).  
In the industrial organization literatures retail prices are often assumed to be determined by the 
conditions of the wholesale market (Tirole, 1988). In the mark-up model, prices are determined 
by the upstream of the supply chain to the downstream, although, there are some criticisms on it. 
Examining the market functioning at the vertical level in developing countries is of importance 
to evaluate how the private traders and the markets are delivering for the producers and the 
consumers’ welfare. It is also important to identify what kind of policy can be introduced, if 
needed at all and at what level of the marketing chain to correct the market inefficiency, if any. 
The vertical price leadership at the wholesale level to the retail in the marketing literature is 
inferred in one hand but also in the other hand in the development economics literatures, there 
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are suspicious that in the developing country, the retail price might dominate the wholesale 
prices but none of these are empirically verified and conclusive in any cases. On the contrary, 
there are many empirical studies on spatial price integration of agricultural commodities in the 
developing countries (Ravallioan, 1986; Baulche, 1997; Kuiper, et al., 1999; Abdulai, 2000). 
Therefore, this paper is an attempt to fill up this gap. The paper address the research questions: Is 
there a relationship between wholesale and retail prices in rice supply chain in the regime of new 
market environment in Bangladesh or is price formation independent each other? Is the 
wholesale market dominates the retail one or the vice-versa? Is the price relationship linear or 
non-linear? In other words, whether price relationship in the supply chain is symmetric with 
respect to price increases and price decrease? The next section describes the data used in the 
analysis followed by the econometric methodology and results in section 3. The last section 
concludes.  
2. Data 
The paper uses the monthly average wholesale and retail price of rice for Bangladesh. The 
wholesale price data used for this study are taken from Global Information on Early Warning 
System, FAO. The monthly retail prices are taken from different published issues of Statistical 
Yearbooks and the Economic Trends published from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), 
Bangladesh and the Bangladesh Bank (BB) respectively. The data period covers from February 
2002 to June, 2007. The data period was selected on the basis of availability of a continuous time 
series data for the entire set of the price variables considered. The data period considered here 
seem consistent for such exercise as there were not any abnormalities in the prices.   
3. Analytical framework and results 
The paper follows different steps sequentially to answer the research questions addressed in the 
introduction section. Since the data are monthly basis, it may contain seasonality effect. 
Therefore we deseasonalised monthly data with orthogonalised (centered) seasonal dummy to 
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remove seasonality. The first step of testing cointegration is to testing all the time series variables 
for their stationarity. Therefore, augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Philip Perron (PP) test 
were performed to test whether the data are difference stationary or trend stationary and to 
determine the number of the unit roots at the level data. The ADF tests use the following 
equation.  
∆  	  
   ∆

	
                   1 
Where Yt is the respective price series and ∆ is first difference (Yt-Yt-1) operator and εt denotes 
white noise error term. Equation (1) tests the null of a unit root (  0 against a stationary 
alternative ( < 0). We also test the presence of a unit root using Philip and Perron (1988) in the 
following specification.  
X  c  βt  T2  ρX	  v                2 
Where " is respective time series, {t - 2
T ), is the time trend and T is the sample size, νt is the 
usual white noise error term. This procedure, in fact, uses a non-parametric adjustment to the 
Dickey–Fuller test statistics and allows for dependence and heterogeneity in the error tem. 
Equation (2) also tests the null of a unit root (  0 against a stationary alternative ( < 0). 
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Table 1: Unit root test results   
Prices Series 
(Tests) 
Deseasonalised level First 
Differences 
#  $%&) 
Order of 
Integration 
I(d) 
#  $%' #  $%', 
Wholesale      
Augmented Dickey Fuller -0.200 -2.492 -8.234** I(1) 
Philip Perron 0.350 -2.527 -8.250** I(1) 
Retail      
Augmented Dickey Fuller -0.179 -2.507 -8.899** I(1) 
Philip Perron -0.186 -2.402 -8.852** I(1) 
Critical values #' #', #& 
Level of Significance 5 %  10 % 5 %  10 % 5 %  10 % 
Augmented Dickey Fuller -2.907 -2.591 -3.482 -3.169 -1.946 -1.613 
Philip Perron -2.907 -2.591 -3.482 -3.169 -1.946 -1.613 
Notes: Lag length for Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is decided based on Schwarz info criteria (SBC) and 
maximum bandwidth for Philip Perron (PP) test is decided based on Newey-West (1994); ** indicates that unit root 
in the first differences are rejected at 5 percent level; τ-statc , τ-statc, t and τ-statw indicates tau-statistics of random 
walk with drift, random walk with drift and slope, pure random walk respectively 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philip Perron unit root test on each of the variables are 
reported in the Table 1. The results of all the tests indicate that all price series are non-stationary 
at their level but stationary at their first difference. Note that the ADF and PP tests were done 
both only with drift and drift plus trend models. In time series econometrics, it is said that prices 
are integrated of order one denoted by presenting )~+1 and prices of integrated of order zero 
denoted by ∆)~+0. Here the order of the integration is one. Therefore, the results allow to 
proceed for cointegration tests for the testing the long run equilibrium relationship. 
Cointegration tests using maximum likelihood estimation   
Once we found the price series (wholesale and retail prices) are non-stationary we apply 
Johansen and Juselius (1990 and 1992) maximum likelihood estimation technique, begins with a 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model in which a vector of price (P x 1) at time t are related to the 
vector of past prices. According to Granger representation theorem, the vector Pt has a vector 
autoregressive error correction representation in the following specification: 
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-)  .)	   /0
	
0	
-)0  12  3      3 
Where Π  ∑ 6070	  + and Γ0   ∑ 6708	  
Pt is a (P x 1) dimension vector corresponding to the number of price series in which all the 
prices are ~+1, the Π, Γ9 and 1 are parameter matrices with (P x P) to be estimated, D is a 
vector with deterministic elements (constant, trend and dummy) and ω is a (P x 1) random error 
follows as usual Gaussian white noise process with zero mean and constant variances. From the 
equation (3), there can never be any relationship between a variable with a stochastic trend, +1 
and a variable without a stochastic trend, +0. Therefore from the equation (3), three cases are 
permissible. So, if ∆)~+0, then Π will be a zero matrix except when a linear combination of 
the variables in ) is stationary. So the specific interest of testing is, the rank of matrix (Π) which 
contains long run information (also the loading factors) about the variables. First case, If rank 
(Π) = P, then Π is invertible and all the variables in levels are stationary meaning that no co-
integration exists, Second, if rank (Π) = 0, i. e., Π is a null matrix meaning that all the elements 
in the adjustment matrix has value zero, therefore, none of the linear combinations are stationary, 
and can be estimated the unrestricted VAR to identify the short run-dynamics. Third, according 
to the Granger representation theorem that when 0< rank (Π=r) < P, there are r cointegrating 
vectors or r stationary linear combinations of the variables. For example if rank (Π = r) = 1, there 
is single cointegrating vector or one linear combination which is stationary such that the 
coefficient matrix Π can be decomposed into Π  ;
<  where ; is the speed of the adjustment 
vector (loading factor) and 
 is the long run equilibrium (cointegrating) vector. In this case P is 
+1 but the combination 
< P	  is +0.  So, the Johansen method is to estimate the Π matrix 
from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether we can reject the restrictions implied by the 
reduced rank of Π. There are two methods of testing for reduced rank (Π), the trace test and 
maximum eigen value which are as follows: 
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>?@'A  B  ln 1 
E
0?8	
>FG0     4 
>I@JK, K  1  BLM1  >?8	     5 
Where, >0 is the estimated values of the ordered eigen values obtained from the estimated matrix 
and T is the number of usable observations after the lag adjustment. The trace statistics tests the 
null hypothesis that the number of distinct cointegrating vectors (r) is less than or equal to r 
against a general alternative. Another statistics called maximal Eigen value tests the null that the 
number of cointegrating vectors is r against the alternative of r +1 cointegrating vectors.   
The trace test (λtrace) and maximum eigenvalue (λmax) results from equation (4) and (5) are 
presented in Table 2. Many studies showed that the rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
integration by using only trace test is sufficient to identify the cointegration rank (Dawson and 
Dey, 2002; Mohanty et al., 1996; Taylor et al., 1996). From the test results in Table 2, it is seen 
that in the vertical level of rice supply chain contain one cointegrating vector. That means this 
cointegrating rank gives the number of stationary linear combinations of the price series. So it is 
consistent with the identification of one linear combination of prices (as it is a bi-variate case) 
that exhibits stability over the time. The leg length was determined using AIC and SIC but as the 
inclusion of the deterministic terms (constant and trend) in the cointegration space is sensitive to 
the identification of cointegration rank, therefore according to Harris and Sollis (2003) we 
estimated three realistic models which are denoted by model 2, model 3 and model 4 implicit in 
equation (3). Model 2 restricts all the deterministic components to a constant in the cointegration 
space, model 3 allows linear trends in the level of the variables and in model 4, the linear trend is 
allowed in the cointegration space. From the three different estimated models; we find there is no 
evidence of cointegration in the case of model 2 and model 4. There is one cointegration relation 
identified in the model 3. Both the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests rejected the null of no 
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cointegration at 5 percent significant level. The specification tests shows there are no problem of 
the autocorrelation, heterosacdasticty and non-normality.  
Table 2: Johansen cointegration test results  
 
Cointegration rank (r) 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Test 
statistics 
(λtrace), 
(λmax) 
Critical 
values 
(λ 0.95) 
Test 
statistics 
(λtrace), 
(λmax) 
Critical 
values 
(λ 0.95) 
Test 
statistics 
(λtrace), 
(λmax) 
Critical 
values 
(λ 0.95) 
Trace statistics (λtrace)       
OP:  K  0   R$ O	: K S 1 19.802 20.262 15.133** 15.095 21.844 25.872 
OP:  K T 1   R$ O	: K S 2 4.354 9.165 0.002 3.841 6.225 12.518 
Maximum eigenvalue 
statistics (λmax) 
  
    
OP:  K  0   R$ O	: K  1 15.449 15.892 15.131** 14.265 15.619 19.387 
OP:  K T 1   R$ O	: K  2 4.354 9.165 0.002 3.841 6.225 12.518 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are the 95% critical values of the respective test statistics, ** indicates the 
hypotheses are rejected at the 5% level 
Testing Causality in the VECM framework 
So far, there were only an attempt (Jayanta Das et. al., 1997) to measure the relationship and the 
causality between the wholesale and retail price of rice for major two cities (Dhaka and 
Chittagong) in Bangladesh. The authors used conventional Granger Causality using F-test for the 
causality without testing the long-run equilibrium relationship. If the variables are co-integrated 
in the long run, the conventional Engle-Granger causality is not a valid test. For testing the 
asymmetry in the same study, the authors used only one dummy variable to capture the increases 
and decreases of the exogenous prices (wholesale in that case). But the present study is an 
attempt to use the state of the art methodology for testing first the log-run relationship and then 
the direction of the causality followed by the asymmetry test.  
Once it is found that there is a long run-relationship between the prices, but there is still a 
problem of identification the direction of causality. Therefore, the existence of cointegration in 
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the bi-variate relationship implies Granger causality which under certain restrictions can be 
tested within the framework of Johansen cointegration by standard Wald test (Masconi and 
Giannini 1992; Dolado and Lutkephol, 1996). If α matrix in the cointegration matrix (Π) has a 
complete column of zeros, no casual relationship exist, because there is no cointegrating vector 
appear in that particular block. For pair-wise causal relationship, it can be written in the 
following two equations 
∆)UV	   
7&)U0   
7?)W0
G
	

	
	
;		X	,	  ,	           4 
∆)WVG   
7&)U0   
7?)W0
G
	

	
	
;G	XG,	  ,G         5 
In the equations (4 and 5), there are three possible cases of testing causality if the variables are 
co-integrated in the long run: 
a) α11 ≠0, α21≠0, which implies bi-directional causality meaning that there exist a feed-back 
long run relationship between two variables and no individual price play leadership role 
b) α11 =0, α21 ≠0, implies uni-directional causality and wholesale price granger causes to the 
retail price, retail price is weakly exogenous in this block  
c) α21=0, α11≠0, implies uni-directional causality and retail price granger causes to the 
wholesale prices, wholesale price is weakly exogenous in this block  
There can never be both α11 =0, α21=0 as our previous result shows that there is a long run 
equilibrium relationship between the price series. The tests results clearly failed to accept the 
reject case (a) and case (b) but accept the case (b). So in the bi-variate price relationship, the   
wholesale price is weakly exogenous.   
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Table 3: Restrictions on the VECM for testing causality between the retail & the wholesale 
prices 
Rank (Π) Trace test Max. 
eigenvalue 
Exogeneity test Causality direction 
Retail price 
HP: α		  0 R$   H	: α		 Z 0 
Wholesale price 
HP: αG	  0 R$   H	: αG	 Z 0 
OP:  K  0   R$ 
O	: K S 1 
15.133** 
[0.05] 
15.131**  
[0.036] 
 
 
4.698** 
[0.030] 
 
 
2.283 
[0.131] 
 
Uni-directional 
(wholesale prices 
cause retail prices) OP:  K T 1   R$ 
O	: K S 2 
0.002  
[0.961) 
0.002  
[0.961] 
* and ** indicates the significant level at 5 per cent and 10 percent respectively; the significant level are in the 
parentheses 
Testing Asymmetry 
Houck (1977) developed a test for asymmetry in the price transmission based on the splitting of 
price variables into increasing or decreasing cases. Other studies, notably Boyd and Brorsen 
(1988); Kinnucan and Forker (1987); Baily and Brorsen (1989); Zhang, Fletcher, and Carley 
(1995); Mohanty, Peterson and Kruse (1195); Willet, Hansmire and Bernard (1997), Peltzman 
(2000); and Bart Minten (2000) Aguiar (2002) followed the suit. All of these studies differ from 
each other in technical point of views but focused the testing of asymmetry in the agricultural 
and food markets in the developed countries. With few exceptions, all the previous researches, at 
least in the agricultural economics literature have not considered the inherent time series 
properties of the data i. e., non-stationarity and the long run equilibrium relationship. The 
asymmetric error correction model approach was motivated first by the fact that all the 
aforementioned approach in the Houck specification was not consistent with the cointegration 
between the retail and the farm price series (Von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) and von Cramon-
Taubadel and Loy (1999)). They first recognized the inconsistencies by investigating asymmetric 
price behavior of producer and consumer prices of the pork market in Germany. They concluded 
the classical Houck approach is fundamentally incorrect with cointegration between two price 
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series. Two recent articles by Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) and Giliola Frey (2007) 
provided a comprehensive discussion of the possible causes and types of the asymmetric price 
transmission along with a brief review of the empirical works done during last couple of decades. 
The authors concluded that the existing literature is far from being conclusive and it has largely 
been method driven with little attention devoted to the theoretical underpinnings and the 
plausible interpretation of the results. Therefore much interesting theoretical and empirical works 
remains to be done. All the literatures discussed above are based on the asymmetry in 
agricultural markets in developed countries but there are not many such studies in the context of 
the developing countries. There are few studies who dealt the asymmetry problem in the 
agricultural markets in developing countries notably Abdulai (2000), Michele and Johann 
(2006), Van Campenhout (2007) and found the existence of asymmetry in the developing 
countries agricultural and food commodities markets.   
To test the asymmetric transmission in the prices we used the asymmetric ECM-EG modeling 
approach. In this stage, based on our results of cointegration and causality we proceed for 
focusing the asymmetric error correction representation, in the form of an asymmetric error 
correction model. When the two variables are co-integrated the estimates in the Engle-Granger 
(1987) two steps methodology are super consistent, that is why we decided to estimate the 
asymmetry using this methodology. From our earlier results, we use wholesale price of rice as 
exogenous for estimating the static OLS, so that  
W)  [P  [	U)  \                6 
In where the RP is the retail price, WP is the wholesale prices, t is the time trend and ε is the 
usual error term. The short term dynamic price adjustment based on error correction model is  
-W)  V	   
?7-W)0
	
0	
  
&7-U)0
G
0P
 ;̂	  _               7 
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From the equation (7), 
?7and 
&7 measures the short run impact of changes in retail prices and 
the domestic prices respectively but α measure the speed of the adjustment to the long run 
equilibrium, ̂	 is the estimated lag residuals from the long run cointegration equation in 
equation (6). As we expect that the adjustment towards long run-equilibrium and adjustment of 
wholesale prices increases and price decreases towards retail price, that is why, the equation (7) 
can be re-parameterization into equation (8) by splitting the wholesale price increase and price 
decreases and also the adjustment towards long run equilibrium when the error correction term is 
positive and negative values. The asymmetric price adjustment of equation (8) is as follows 
The ECM-EG asymmetric model has the following form 
-W)   
?7
	
0	
W)0   
&7
G
0P
U)0  ;		 X	,	   
?7
a
0	
W)08   
&78
b
0P
∆)U08
 ;		8 X	,	                             8 
From the equation (8), the existence of asymmetry, will be tested by the implementation of the 
Wald χ2-test for the hypothesis that ;		8  ;		  as well as the asymmetry in 
&78  
&7  with 
different lag periods. In addition we also tests the hypothesis of  
?7	8  
?7	 . If any of 
the hypotheses are rejected then the asymmetric error correction model is superior. We also 
estimated the symmetric error correction model to verify our results that both the series are 
cointegrated. 
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Table 4: Results of the symmetric and asymmetric price transmission    
Regressors Symmetric ECM-EG model Asymmetric ECM-EG  
Co-efficients t-statistics Co-efficients t-statistics 
Intercept -0.247* -2.598 -0.243* -2.482 
∆U) 0.269** 2.822 - - 
∆U)	 0.253* 2.260 - - 
∆W)	 -0.286* -2.512 - - 
∆W)8	 - - -0.308* -2.051 
∆W)	 - - -0.336 -1.398 
∆U)8 - - 0.474** 3.129 
∆U) - - -0.082 -0.506 
∆U)8	 - - 0.352* 2.11 
∆U)8	 - - 0.162 0.942 
∆U)8G - - 0.424** 2.889 
∆U)8G - - -0.102 -0.569 
;	8 - - -0.009 -0.060 
;	 - - -0.566** -2.786 
; -0.247** -2.597   
R2 0.38 0.56 
Ramsey RESET test 3.16 [~F (1, 57)] 3.417 [~F (1, 50)] 
LM autocorrelation test 1.76 [~F (2, 56)] 0.485 [~F (2, 49)] 
Normality test (JB) 2.77 [0.25] 1.26 
ARCH test 0.813 [~F (1, 60)] 0.761 [~F (1, 59)] 
CUSUM test Lies within the 5% level of 
significance  
Lies within the 5% level of 
significance 
 Cointegration equation in the first stage of ECM-EG 
 W)  4.759  0.704U)  0.056 
(4.455) (7.859) (6.812) 
Test for cointegration OP: ;=0 vs O	: ; Z0  
(No cointegration)  
χ
2 (1) =6.747** (0.009) 
Test for cointegration  OP: ;		8  ;		  0 (No 
cointegration) 
χ
2(1)=9.317** (0.009) 
Wald Test for Symmetry   
Hypothesis 1: OP: ;		8  ;		  R$ O	: ;		8 Z ;		  χ2(1)= 3.676* (0.05) 
Hypothesis 2: OP: 
&78  
&7  R$ O	: 
&78 Z 
&7  χ2(1)=4.530* (0.03) 
Hypothesis 3: OP: 
&7	8  
&7	  R$ O	: 
&7	8 Z 
&7	  χ2(1)=0.514 (0.473) 
Hypothesis 4: OP: 
&7G8  
&7G  R$ O	: 
&7G8 Z 
&7G  χ2(1)=4.162* (0.041) 
Hypothesis 4: OP: 
?7	8  
?7	  R$ O	: 
?7	8 Z 
?7	  χ2(1)=0.009 (0.935) 
* indicates the hypothesis are rejected at the 5 percent level of significance, the probability level are in the 
parentheses 
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Table (4) shows the results of the both models. The hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected in 
the symmetric error correction model. The sign and the magnitude of the error correction tem 
provide the expected results. Our specific interest of testing the asymmetry, therefore we tested 
different hypotheses which are given in the Table 4 and denoted from hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 
4. We failed to reject the null of symmetric adjustment towards its long run equilibrium. We also 
failed to reject the null of the adjustment of wholesale prices increase and price decrease towards 
the retail prices. So the estimated model support on asymmetric price transmission for rice in 
Bangladesh.   
4. Conclusion 
The paper focuses on time series estimation to test the price transmission and the asymmetry in 
the vertical level of the rice supply chain in Bangladesh. The objective of this paper is to estimate 
the link between different levels of supply chain for commodity rice which is subject to the 
different level of controversy in the policy level.  The result shows that the wholesale and retail 
prices are integrated in the long run, and in the line of the industrial organization theory and the 
mark-up model in the pricing analysis, the wholesale price (as upstream) plays a leadership role 
to determine the retail price (at downstream). Results also confirm that the consumer and public 
concern about the asymmetric price transmission that wholesaler pass on increases in wholesale 
prices to consumers as quickly as wholesale price decreases holds true. Note that our analysis is 
not confirming the sources where the asymmetry comes from. There can be considerable interest 
to find out the causes of the asymmetry and there are much remains that to be done in the future 
research in this aspect. Therefore, the policy maker should be very cautious to formulate any 
decision on the existing private traders dominated markets efficiency which supposed to be much 
welfare enhancing for the poor consumers who mostly depends on the markets for rice.  
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